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Galileo Galilei’s contribution during the early stages of the scientific revolution and his clash with the Catholic Church have 
been discussed, studied, and written about for many decades. There 
are indications however that recent work in this area has tended to 
underestimate the fact that Galileo had a particular style. By style 
here I mean a particular combination of behavioural features that 
are specific to a person or a historical period. Style of course can be 
related to behaviour in general, but what is relevant in this paper is 
the combination of dispositions that determine a particular way of 
engaging in science, as discussed by scholars like A. C. Crombie.1 
Galileo, I will argue, had a scientific style marked by overconfidence. 
he tended to downplay the importance of obvious contradictory 
evidence that undermined his claims, and he did this by producing 
auxiliary hypotheses that sometimes verged on the extravagant. If we 
focus on this somewhat neglected aspect of his style, some interesting 
new questions emerge: To what extent did Galileo depend on such 
auxiliary hypotheses? how insecure did they render his position? 
And how ad hoc were they? In this paper, I explore these questions 
by comparing two important debates: one about the nature of water 
and buoyancy, the other about cosmology. since the main features 
1
2 Aqua Incognita: why ice floats on water and Galileo 400 years on
of the cosmology debate, the one involving Galileo’s defence of 
heliocentrism, are well known, I will dedicate more time to the water 
debate, before proceeding to highlight the elements of style that 
are common to both debates, and to evaluate the relevance of these 
elements for current understanding of scientific practice. 
1. The buoyancy debate
First, a word about Galileo’s social and cultural situation. The way 
empirical inquiry used to be motivated and propagated at that time, 
when what we now call the scientific revolution was at its infancy, 
differed considerably from the way it is today. In that context, the 
driving force used to originate mainly not from scientific questioning 
as such but from what the major patrons of individual scholars regarded 
as marvels and curiosities, from what these patrons considered worthy 
of exciting debates and controversy. The question “Why does ice float 
on water?” was one clear example of an exciting question because 
we all know that ice is in fact nothing more than water. The overall 
social, political, and cultural context in the seventeenth century was 
such that science was dependent to a very large extent on what patrons 
wanted, and this meant that natural philosophers, or anyone we would 
now recognize as a scientist, could never be fully in control of their 
research. Patron-dependence was crucial: through financial support, 
it made the scientist’s work possible. But it produced a number of 
difficulties as well, mainly because the general habitat for science, 
where science happened, was not the isolated laboratory but pubic 
disputation, and this mode of scientific practice usually drew attention 
not to careful and technical understanding but to quick, publicly 
accessible answers. Moreover, during the period when Galileo 
flourished, mathematics was still considered a discipline that was less 
important than Aristotelian philosophy within the overall hierarchy 
of knowledge. Galileo had to struggle hard against this mindset. The 
only way he could gain a hearing was to make himself philosophically 
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versatile enough to engage with the Aristotelians on the same level.2-6
With this background in mind, we can now appreciate better the 
various forces at work during the debate that concerns us here, the one 
concerning water and buoyancy. This was launched in the summer of 
1611, a session that took three days. It started with a dispute about the 
nature of cold as a quality, but then shifted into one about buoyancy. 
The major contention arose when the Aristotelians among those 
present were shocked to learn that, for Galileo, ice was not condensed 
water, as they had always assumed. They had to admit that the issue 
was not completely clear in the classic texts. Although Aristotle had 
indeed indicated that ice was condensed water, his reflections on 
this point were rather sketchy. For instance, in his Metaphysics he 
discussed the different senses in which the word “is” can be used, and 
the examples he offers include ice. he writes: “[the word] ‘is’ has [a] 
number of senses; for a thing ‘is’ a threshold because it is situated in 
a particular way, and ‘to be a threshold’ means to be situated in this 
particular way, and ‘to be ice’ means to be condensed in this particular 
way. Some things have their being defined in all these ways: by being 
partly mixed, partly blended, partly bound, partly condensed.”7,8 
Aristotle here takes the idea that ice is condensed water as obvious. 
Why? We find no clear answer in Aristotle’s own works, but his 
followers filled up the reasoning behind this in the following way. He 
must have started not from the fact that ice floats on water but from 
the fact that it is colder than water. since ice is colder than water, it 
must be water minus something, minus some amount of heat, and this 
lack leads to a condensation. It is water with a deficiency, as it were, 
not with something extra. And as regards the question why ice floats, 
Aristotelians considered this fact as just one example of buoyancy in 
general. For them, buoyancy is a matter of shape only. It had nothing 
to do with density. On this issue, they were certainly following their 
master who had explained this point quite carefully. In his book De 
Caelo, he argued that shape matters because the determining factor 
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in buoyancy is the difference that the various materials we consider 
show as regards penetrability. For instance, air is more penetrable than 
water, and water is more penetrable than earth (see Figure I.1). he 
adds: “the reason why broad things keep their place [e.g. a plank of 
wood afloat on water] is because they cover so wide a surface, and the 
greater quantity [i.e. the water] is less easily disrupted. Bodies of the 
opposite shape sink down because they occupy so little of the surface, 
which is therefore easily parted.”9 It is good for us to recall here that, in 
Galileo’s times, Aristotelians used to feel obliged to defend Aristotle, 
be it on buoyancy or geocentrism, or any other issue, not only because 
his positions were justified, as indeed they thought they were, but also 
because they considered these various positions important individual 
bricks that held an entire worldview in place. For them, removing one 
brick could have devastating consequences that would destabilize the 
entire conceptual scheme.
What was Galileo’s reaction to this? For him, Aristotelians were 
seeing the entire issue the wrong way round. They had started from 
the observation that ice is colder than water and had sidelined the fact 
that ice floats on water. What they should have done was to start from 
the fact that ice floats on water. For Galileo, since ice floats on water, it 
must be rarified water, not condensed water. And as regards buoyancy, 
Figure I.1. Galileo’s original diagram for his defence against                          
the lodovico delle Colombe.11
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Galileo resorted to another ancient source: Archimedes. While 
Aristotle had developed a shape-theory of buoyancy, Archimedes 
had developed a density-theory, according to which a thing in water 
experiences a buoyant force equal to the weight of water displaced. 
Galileo did not deny that shape matters. he conceded that the shape 
of a body affected the speed with which it sinks or rises, but was 
convinced that shape does not affect whether it sinks or rises. 
Up to this point, the debate seemed well balanced. Both sides 
presented interesting insights, and both had a heavyweight from Ancient 
Greece as support. The decisive factor came when Galileo’s main 
opponent, lodovico delle Colombe, devised a simple but spectacular 
and decisive experiment. he did not want to resort to Aristotelian 
deductive reasoning or anything like that. he appealed instead to 
direct evidence, just like Galileo. he made all the participants gather 
round the demonstrating table and he showed them how a sphere of 
ebony, whose density is higher than that of water, sinks when placed 
on water, while a thin piece of the same material remains afloat even 
with some weights on it. so the determining factor was shape, not 
density – full stop. 
Galileo must have been quite astounded by this, but he did not give 
up. he tried to come up with some way of explaining this experiment 
in his own terms. This was not easy at all, because according to his 
worldview there should not be any special effect at the surface of a 
liquid which does not arise elsewhere within liquid. In other words, his 
view of liquids ruled out what we now call surface tension. he took 
therefore another line of argument and tried to bring in the relevance 
of wetness, but this lead to no convincing conclusion. since the dispute 
itself became noisy and inconclusive, the meeting was brought to a 
close, and the main protagonists left with the intention of producing 
a full written version of their position. Galileo, encouraged to proceed 
with this by his patron, duke Cosimo II, took his task seriously, and 
produced his written text within a year. For him, maintaining the duke’s 
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favour was obviously important. We notice once again how science was 
dependent on patronage to an extent that is hard for us to accept today. 
Galileo’s written version, entitled Discourse on Bodies in Water 
and published in 1612, was based on Archimedes’s classic work On 
Floating Bodies, which had emphasized hydrostatics. Archimedes had 
offered an account of buoyancy that had been intended to explain the 
situation once equilibrium is reached. In other words, he had described 
the state of affairs when a body is stationary and floating, or when it has 
sunk and lies at the bottom. he had said nothing about the process of 
rising to the surface or of sinking; his view had been limited to statics 
as opposed to dynamics. Galileo therefore saw a way of breaking new 
ground by delving into hydrodynamics. This was a risky business, 
because in claiming the right to give an account of motion, he was 
encroaching into the philosophers’ domain – yet again. resorting to 
the model of the lever, he wanted to explain the downward motion of 
a sinking body and the corresponding upward rise of the water surface, 
two motions with different speeds. And he did this by resorting to the 
model of a lever with different arm-lengths, a lever that makes a short 
swing on the short side and a quick swing on the long side. he adopts 
therefore a mechanical view of the world – and this was seriously at 
odds with the Aristotelian worldview, at least in two senses.
First of all, Aristotelians had always believed that each of the four 
elements had its own specific motion: for instance earthly bodies 
move down because they have heaviness, while fiery ones move up, 
because they have lightness. heaviness and lightness were for them 
real attributes belonging to things according to their nature. each 
object or material will therefore have its share of overall heaviness 
or lightness in proportion to its constitution from the elements. From 
these fundamental, elemental motions, therefore Aristotelians offered 
the explanation of all motion. As regards the specific case we are 
dealing with here, the case of sinking or floating, the shape of the 
body, they used to say, was not the determining factor but only a causa 
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per accidens, an explanation of secondary importance. The floating 
object needs to be understood in terms of its own inherent constitution 
in terms of the elements, the proportion of which determines the 
object’s intrinsic quantity of heaviness and of lightness. Galileo was 
dissociating himself entirely from this kind of explanation. he was 
proposing a worldview in which buoyancy was the result neither of 
an innate upward trend (lightness as an attribute) nor of an effect of 
shape. For him, it was the result of the body’s downward motion being 
counterbalanced by a counterforce. The implication here was that 
bodies, be they predominantly earthy or predominantly fiery, have only 
one type of motion: downwards. The Aristotelians were not amused. 
secondly, the fact that water shows a kind of skin at its surface was 
perfectly in line with the Aristotelians’ broad view of liquids in general. 
For them, water, being a continuum, has a tendency to preserve its 
cohesion and integrity, as their master had expressed quite clearly in 
his work De Caelo: “since there are two factors, the force responsible 
for the downward motion of the heavy body and the disruption-
resisting force of the continuous surface, there must be some ratio 
between the two. For in proportion as the force applied by the heavy 
thing towards disruption and division exceeds that which resides in 
the continuum, the quicker will it force its way down; only if the force 
of the heavy thing is the weaker, will it ride upon the surface.”10 On 
this issue, Galileo had a problem. For him, water was made up of 
corpuscles with no intrinsic difference between them. It did not matter 
whether these corpuscles were at the surface or within the interior of 
the liquid. This view therefore, as mentioned above, ruled out any idea 
of surface-tension. How could Galileo then account for the impressive 
demonstration of his opponent delle Colombe? To account for the 
intriguing floating chip of ebony, he had no choice but to resort to an 
explanation that was considerably extravagant. he proposed that, as 
the chip is lowered onto the surface, the observable slight depression 
of the water surface as it floats makes the chip associate itself with a 
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layer of air above it. In this way, the composite object, layer of air and 
layer of ebony, will have a specific weight less than that of water. Was 
he introducing, through the back door, some occult forces here, some 
“magnetic virtue of air” as his opponents were quick to remark? These 
are his words: 
But if it [the ebony chip as it presses down onto the water 
surface] has already penetrated and is, by its nature, denser than 
water, then why does it not proceed to sink but stops and remains 
suspended within that small cavity that had been produced by 
its weight? I would say: because, as it moves down until its 
[upper] surface arrives at the water level, it loses a part of its 
own weight, and it then proceeds to lose the rest of its weight 
as well by descending deeper even below the water surface, 
which produces a ridge and a bank around it. It loses weight as it 
descends in such a way that it drags down to itself the air above 
it, by adherent contact. This air proceeds to fill up the cavity 
produced by the little water ridges, in such a way that, in this 
case, what really descends and is located in water is not just the 
ebony chip, or the iron chip, but the composite of ebony and air, 
from which there results a solid [solido]which does not exceed 
water in density as does ebony on its own, or gold on its own.11,12
 This is the best Galileo could come up with as he tried to reason 
things out from within his system. I think it is fair to say that, as an 
explanation, it looks farfetched and ad hoc. What it shows is a strong 
determination on his part to save his overall worldview at all costs. he 
was ready to go even that far. 
so, all in all, we can say that debate on water and buoyancy that 
had started viva voce in 1611 and then dragged on in writing for more 
than four years had no clear winner.13 As historians now recognize, one 
important thing we see in this debate is the emergence of a growing 
gap between two very different professional identities: on the one side, 
we have professional philosophers, the Aristotelians, whose principles 
are derived from acknowledged philosophers; on the other side, we 
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have a specimen of a new species of intellectual, a mathematician-
philosopher, who seemed to violate the disciplinary boundaries that 
had been well established and respected for hundreds of years. 
2. Comparing with the astronomy debate
let us draw a quick comparison now between this debate and the one 
on the solar system. As is well known, the main story of the solar-
system debate, in short, was this. With the use of the telescope, Galileo 
discovered new evidence in favour of the heliocentric view that had 
been promoted mathematically by Nicholas Copernicus about fifty 
years beforehand. Galileo therefore started to defend the idea that 
Copernicus’s view was not a mere mathematical shortcut to obtain 
quick predictions of planetary positions, but was a true description of 
how things are. In the ensuing debate, which involved Aristotelians yet 
again, Galileo was challenged to explain some pretty glaring instances 
of counterevidence to his proposals. And this is the crucial point 
where this solar-system debate shows some remarkable similarity 
with the buoyancy debate. In both cases, Galileo had to deal with 
counterevidence that seemed obvious and convincing. In both cases, 
he made proposals that were unconventional and therefore somewhat 
suspicious. 
Instead of going into all the intricate detail of the solar-system 
debate, let us consider the crucial points only. One obvious element 
of counterevidence for the proposal that the earth is in motion is 
direct experience. We simply have no sensation of movement. In line 
with this, as common sense suggests, if the earth were in motion, 
there should be some detectable displacement during the falling of 
an object, because, by the time the object hits the ground, the earth 
would have moved a little. But nothing of the kind is observed. here 
we have, therefore, a serious challenge to anyone who wants to argue 
that the earth moves. For Galileo, however, this kind of argument was 
not the most worrying. he rose to this challenge in a spectacular way 
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by establishing the basic principles of relativity. he proved that, for 
two reference frames in uniform motion, no such displacement should 
be expected.14
The real worrying element of counterevidence was the lack of 
stellar parallax. If the earth were really in motion through space, then 
the nearby stars should show some displacement with respect to the 
distant stars. Our view of the night sky would be somewhat like what 
we see from a moving train: nearby trees shifting across the distant 
background. But no such effect is evident in the night sky. so again, 
Galileo had a problem. he tried to use his telescope, but it was all in 
vain.15 The only way he could respond to this problem was to adopt 
what had already been suggested by some commentators before him, 
namely that the absence of stellar parallax was due to the fact that all 
stars were infinitely far out in space.16,17 This suggestion, of course, 
did solve the problem. It was however ad hoc and embarrassing – 
embarrassing because it went against Galileo’s own idea that Aristotle 
had made a mistake in assuming that there is an essential difference 
between the sub-lunar universe and the rest. For Galileo, the entire 
universe should be homogenous with a uniform distribution of stars 
throughout. 
so here we see a clear common feature with the previous debate, 
a common stylistic feature involving the way science was engaged in. 
In both cases, Galileo faces an insurmountable problem but sticks to 
his guns; he does not shy away from defending himself by walking 
on stilts, as it were: by producing auxiliary hypotheses that, because 
of their ad hoc nature, apparently drain his position of its convincing 
power. 
3. Conclusion
What conclusion can be drawn? There is of course much more that 
can be said about all the major points highlighted above. The little 
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that has been mentioned however is enough to justify the following 
three points. First, we need to accept that the practice of science 
rarely involves clear-cut crucial experiments that decide an issue at 
one go. What has been highlighted in both debates confirms the idea, 
proposed by philosopher Imre lakatos, that science does not develop 
according to naïve falsificationism but according to a more complex 
process involving auxiliary hypotheses.18 These auxiliary hypotheses 
can have various degrees of plausibility or acceptability, depending 
on how they fit in with background beliefs that are shared by both the 
proponent and the opponent of the theory. The early stages of the new 
scientific paradigm inaugurated by Galileo were vulnerable. There 
was no knock-down argument on either side. It is true that, in both 
debates, Galileo’s view did eventually turn out to be correct. At that 
time, however, his case had some obvious weaknesses, even on his 
own terms. secondly, a few words about the Church. Although the way 
the Church handled Galileo during the solar-system debate remains 
an embarrassment, especially because of its official declaration that 
heliocentrism was heretical, which it certainly is not since it is not 
even theological, the arguments mentioned above can nevertheless 
help us understand why the case was so intriguing, and why some 
Aristotelians and theologians were not immediately won over by 
Galileo’s arguments.19,20 And finally, a word about Galileo’s genius: as 
we know, time proved Galileo right in both debates. This shows that 
he was a man of genius: he had a way of seeing ahead, a way of seeing 
beyond what can be expressed by reasoned argument and experiment. 
We see him sometimes groping in the dark, especially in formulating 
auxiliary hypotheses, but in fact he was groping in the right direction.
Postscript
Dor Ben-Amotz has considered my contribution to the Aqua Incognita 
conference worthy of further reflections, which he kindly added as a 
postscript to the paper he published in this volume together with Blake 
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M. rankin. I would like therefore to take this opportunity to add some 
clarifications, especially because some readers may easily be mislead 
by D. Ben-Amotz’s comments.
First, it was good of D. Ben-Amotz to remind us that not everything 
the Jesuits did in their long history was perfect, and that in the 
theological debates concerning Galileo some of them wrote against 
Copernicanism and were in favour of Galileo’s condemnation. 
Ben-Amotz’s basic point however seems dubious, because he 
seems to imply that I embarked on my analysis of Galileo’s use of 
auxiliary hypotheses out of a hidden desire to rehabilitate in some sense 
those Jesuits in the past who wrote against Galileo. This is, of course, 
a biased reading of my paper. One cannot argue that, since Jesuits 
have had defects in the past, and no doubt still have some today, no 
Jesuit today should discuss the way Galileo responded to criticism. Of 
course, I readily admit that, in the ill-fated theological debate between 
the Church and Galileo, the role of the Jesuits, and indeed of the entire 
Church, is a very important issue that deserves careful and impartial 
study. The very complex process has been studied openly and at length 
by professionals, some of them Jesuits, for many decades. 
The four Jesuits most closely involved in this event were probably 
robert Bellarmine, Christopher Clavius, Orazio Grassi, and Melchior 
Inchofer. The first one was in charge of the Holy Office, otherwise known 
as the Roman Inquisition. He had the final say as regards the case at its 
beginning. In an important letter to Paolo Foscarini, he explained his 
position very clearly: he remained cautious and conservative, because 
there had not yet been a definite proof in favour of the Copernican 
model (such as stellar parallax). he remained convinced, moreover, 
that no such definite proof will ever be available. Bellarmine argued 
that, when a mathematical model works well, we cannot automatically 
say that it represents the world as it is. his overly conservative attitude 
may indeed be condemned from our present perspective, but his 
account of science, which philosophers now call an instrumentalist 
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view of science, is certainly not illogical. some prominent physicists 
endorse such a view of science even today. Bellarmine was behind the 
first admonition of 1616, which obliged Galileo to refrain from publicly 
defending the heliocentric theory, but did not forbid him to conjecture 
it. Bellarmine died in 1621, and was not involved in the second 
summoning of Galileo by the Inquisition, which ended with the 1633 
condemnation. Christopher Clavius was a prominent mathematician 
and astronomer at the roman College, best known for his reform of the 
calendar still in use today. he was delighted to welcome Galileo at the 
College and confirm his observations. After Galileo’s first admonition, 
however, Clavius was obliged by his superiors to refrain from any 
public support of Galileo, and to retain all teaching within the precincts 
of Aristotelianism. Orazio Grassi, mathematician, astronomer, and 
architect, had a direct clash with Galileo regarding the nature of 
comets. For Grassi, comets where real objects above the moon because 
they showed parallax, while for Galileo they were optical illusions. 
In The Assayer, Galileo used all his wit against Grassi in a way that, 
for some readers, amounts to unjustified ridicule. The fourth Jesuit in 
my list, Melchior Inchofer was commissioned by Pope Urban VIII 
to write a theological justification of the 1633 condemnation. In his 
final document, he argued that, in the book Dialogue on the Two Chief 
World-Systems, Galileo did not remain neutral as he had promised but 
sided with the heliocentric view. Inchofer moreover went on to argue 
that believers were obliged to hold the geocentric view as a matter of 
faith. Although, given the juridical system within which the event took 
place, the ultimate responsibility for Galileo’s condemnation should be 
seen as resting on Pope Urban VIII himself, we should also note that 
the one who wrote most explicitly against heliocentrism and made it 
look heretical was Inchofer.21
This brief sketch is enough to show how the theological debate, 
with its political and cultural overtones, together with the Jesuits’ 
involvement within it, was a highly complex event, and simple 
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characterizations of it can be misleading. As D. Ben-Amotz rightly 
pointed out, Galileo was instrumental in reminding theologians that 
the Bible should not always be taken literally. In other words, Galileo 
recalled what st Augustine had said about a thousand years earlier. 
This is an important point, and should undoubtedly be counted in 
Galileo’s favour. Biblical interpretation however was not the topic of 
my conference paper. Ben-Amotz seems to suggest that, since I did not 
mention anything about the theological mistakes of the Church, I was 
deliberately misleading the conference participants. such a criticism 
however would be unfair, because my paper was focused on the debate 
on water and buoyancy – as required by the conference organizers – 
and that particular debate raised no theological questions whatsoever. 
For readers to have a better overall picture of the Jesuits’ engagement 
with the natural sciences, it may help to recall that they certainly 
cannot, as a group, be considered anti-scientific. On the contrary, the 
society of Jesus, in spite of its many imperfections, has produced in 
the course of its four hundred year history many eminent scientists 
and mathematicians. Without wanting to sound triumphalistic, I may 
just recall that, by 1773, of the world’s 130 astronomy observatories, 
thirty were operated by Jesuits. There are now thirty-five lunar craters 
named in honour of Jesuit scientists. 
Secondly, D. Ben-Amotz seems to think that, for me, Galileo was a 
genius because he showed moments of irrationality. This was certainly 
not my conclusion. A mature and responsible history of science is one 
that accepts the complexity of any human enterprise whatever it is: 
there are no perfect Jesuits, there are no perfect scientists. It accepts 
that scientific development involves both explicit and tacit knowledge, 
and that there can be both moments of success and moments of failure. 
examining the mistakes of scientists is not a way of discrediting them, 
but a way of appreciating their greatness, which is evident also in the 
way they pushed ahead, in spite of their limited resources, through 
horizons that, for them, were pretty dark. 
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And thirdly, D. Ben-Amotz adds that Galileo’s genius lay in 
his defence of the idea that the scientific method, based on ‘visual 
certainty’, should trump all other claims to knowledge. No doubt, 
Galileo’s innovations regarding the scientific method are admirable 
to the highest degree, and have contributed greatly to civilization. 
The simple association of the scientific method with ‘visual certainty’ 
however needs serious qualification. Observation certainly plays 
a key role in the methods of the sciences, but, as every philosophy 
undergraduate knows, scientific observation is inevitably loaded with 
prior theory, and, as a consequence, demonstration and interpretation 
are inevitable and not always straightforward. had science been simply 
a matter of visual certainty, we would still be holding that the sun 
moves and the earth stands still. Galileo’s point was that, if a scientific 
claim clashes with a theological one, and the scientific claim is based 
securely on observation and demonstration, then the theological 
claim should give way, in the sense that the biblical interpretations or 
philosophical positions on which it was based should be revised. This 
is a perfectly valid point. The majority view within Christianity today 
is that, if the sciences are engaged in properly, and according to moral 
norms, they will never really conflict with religious faith, because both 
the material world, studied by these sciences, and divine revelation, 
studied by theology, derive from the same God. The genuine scientist 
who labours humbly to discover the truths of nature is in fact being 
led by the hand of God. This point can be expressed in other words: 
‘science can only be created by those who are thoroughly imbued 
with the aspiration toward truth and understanding. This source of 
feeling, however, springs from the sphere of religion. To this there 
also belongs the faith in the possibility that the regulations valid for 
the world of existence are rational, that is, comprehensible to reason. I 
cannot conceive of a genuine scientist without that profound faith. The 
situation may be expressed by an image: science without religion is 
lame, religion without science is blind.’ These are the words of Albert 
einstein.22
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